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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

DK Communist China - USSR: Chinese Communist spokesmen used the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting which ended in Peiping yesterday as a forum for encouraging dissent from Moscow's views on East-West relations and soliciting support for China's hard line toward the US. The president of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions insisted that "no talks can take the place of struggle." The vice president of the same organization said it is "inconceivable" that there could be general disarmament before "the socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world." Chinese leaders probably feel that these attacks on negotiations and general disarmament may deter Khrushchev from returning to detente tactics with the United States, or at least lend some support to his critics in the bloc.

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DK Belgian Congo: Widespread but disorganized opposition among Congolese political groups to Patrice Lumumba--whose party won a plurality in the Congo's first legislative elections last month--poses the threat of a major political crisis even before the Congo attains its independence on 30 June. Although the Belgians would

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prefer to keep Lumumba out of the new government, they appear disposed, in the absence of any acceptable alternative, to invite him to form one. Such a step could well trigger secessionist efforts in one or more of the Congo's six provinces.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Chinese Continue Attacks on Khrushchev's Foreign Policy

Liu Chang-sheng, member of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party and a vice president of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), told the WFTU general council on 8 June that it is "inconceivable" that there could be general disarmament until "the socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world." The day before, Liu Ning-i, president of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, had stated, "No talks can take the place of struggle." These statements and a recent People's Daily editorial are the most outspoken public criticism yet made by the Chinese of policies with which Khrushchev personally is associated.

Liu Chang-sheng gave cursory support to the Soviet disarmament proposal of 2 June and then described it merely as a means "to arouse the people... to unmask the aggressive nature of imperialism." He denied that the Soviet proposal could be realized. Paraphrasing earlier comments by Khrushchev that disarmament would mean both East and West could give more financial aid to underdeveloped countries, Liu said that to attribute any such intention to the West was a "downright whitewash of imperialism." Liu Ning-i, who spoke in a similar vein on 7 June, said any implication that "peaceful coexistence" could be stretched to include "genuine cooperation" is a "lie to deceive the people."

Such statements as these before an international gathering of Communists make it clear that Peiping intends to encourage bloc dissent from Moscow's views on East-West relations and solicit support openly for Communist China's own hard line toward the United States. The Chinese leaders probably believe that Soviet diplomatic maneuvering may again require a "thaw" in Soviet-American relations. They also may feel that undisguised polemics now are justified in a situation where, since the U-2 incident and collapse of the summit meeting, Khrushchev possibly finds it more difficult to ignore those elements in the bloc which oppose any return to detente tactics.

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Congo Situation Worsening

Widespread but disorganized opposition to Patrice Lumumba among Congolese political groups may bring a worsening of the Congo's pre-independence political crisis. Lumumba--whose party gained a plurality of seats in the Congo legislature in the elections held in late May--is opposed by many of the colony's minor and splinter parties, particularly since his post-election demands for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and for his own investiture as premier.

In addition to stimulating fears of dictatorship among his rivals, Lumumba's actions have revived separatist sentiment in at least three of the Congo's six provinces. In Leopoldville Province, a spokesman for the Abako party announced on 8 June that the party plans to form a provincial government within the framework of a "federal" Congo of autonomous provinces. In Kasai Province, Lumumba's bitter rival Albert Kalonji reportedly has called for the establishment of a separate Kasai state. In mineral-rich Katanga Province, the separatist Conakat party, which holds a majority of seats in the provincial assembly, may revive its threats of secession if its demands for provincial autonomy are not met.

In the absence of an attractive alternative, Belgian authorities may invite Lumumba to form a government, although they will probably refuse his demand that the premier-designate also be made chief of state. Congo Resident Minister Vandermeersch reportedly indicated, prior to flying to Brussels on 8 June, that it might be safer to bestow the premiership on Lumumba than to turn to a weakly joined coalition of moderates which would be open to the charge of being Belgian puppets.

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